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INTRODUCTION
While national attention has focused on the recent Supreme Court
decision, Obergefell v. Hodges,1 which legalized same-sex marriage,
less attention has been paid to the aftermath: how will those same-sex
couples, now legally married, use laws drafted for different-sex
couples? This Note will focus on one of these conflicts: the children
born to and adopted by same-sex couples, and the legal relationship
between the couples and their children within the state of New York. As
nontraditional families have become more prevalent,2 the law has
lagged behind and families have been forced to apply outdated laws to
new arrangements. This is often seen in relation to same-sex couples,
whether married or unmarried, and their children.3 This Note will
1
2

135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
For purposes of this Note “traditional families” are defined as a two-parent household
where both parents are different sexes, and in which the children are biologically related to both
parents or have been adopted by both parents. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood
as an Exclusive Status: The Need for Legal Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family
Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REV. 879, 880 (1984) (“[A]n increasing number of children do not live in
traditional nuclear families.”); Susan N. Gary, Adapting Intestacy Laws to Changing Families, 18
LAW & INEQ. 1, 4 (2000) (“The family structure in the United States has changed dramatically.
Stepfamilies, blended families, unmarried heterosexual and gay and lesbian cohabitants with or
without children—many persons now live in families that no longer fit the Cleaver family norm.”
(footnotes omitted)); Doris Nhan, Census: More in U.S. Report Nontraditional Households,
NAT’L J., May 1, 2012 (“Married straight couples with families now make up less than half of
U.S. households, marking the first time the group has dropped below 50 percent since census data
on families was first collected in 1940.”); Derek Thompson, The Slow Death of ‘Traditional’
Families in America, THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 27, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/
archive/2013/11/the-slow-death-of-traditional-families-in-america/281904 (“Gay marriage laws
have happily extended legal rights to same-sex couples, but over the last half century, a less
auspicious family development has been the rise of single moms and dads and the decline of twoparent households, particularly among lower-income and less-educated families.”).
3 For example, the U.S. Census estimated an 80.4% increase in the number of households
with same sex-partners from 2000 to 2010. Households and Families: 2010, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU (April 2012), http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-14.pdf. It is
important to note, however, that it is possible that the change indicated by the Census is due, at
least in part, to an increase in the number of reported same-sex households rather than an actual
increase. See, e.g., David de Vaus, Diversity and Change in Australian Families: Statistical
Profiles, AUSTRALIAN INST. OF FAMILY STUDIES, 83 (July 2004), http://www.aifs.gov.au/
institute/pubs/diversity/DiversityAndChange.pdf (analyzing the Australian census’s “likely
underestimates” of same-sex couples, and finding that older same-sex couples might be more
reluctant to self-report their relationship). But see Gregory M. Herek et al., Avoiding Heterosexist
Bias in Psychological Research, 46 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 957, 959 (1991), http://www.apa.org/pi/
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address the issue of same-sex parents who are forced to utilize New
York’s laws and procedures which were designed for different-sex
couples. Because of obvious biological differences—a same-sex couple
cannot reproduce without outside involvement—the application of laws
designed with only a father and mother in mind to same-sex couples
will have unintended results.
This Note will proceed in three parts. Part I will discuss several
current and previous methods used by same-sex couples to gain legal
parental status in New York. Because of the patchwork nature of laws
across states, the relevance and efficacy of most of these methods
within other jurisdictions will vary, depending in part on the level of
legal recognition granted to same-sex couples in a given jurisdiction.4
Methods discussed will include types of adoption, gaining parental
status through equitable estoppel, the presumption of legitimacy through
marriage, and acknowledgments of paternity. Additionally, this section
will discuss New York’s Marriage Equality Act5 and the legislative
history and intent behind portions of the Act.
Part II of this Note will examine the problems facing same-sex
couples seeking full legal parental rights over their children. This
section will examine recent illustrative cases in New York to
demonstrate the immediacy of the problem, and thus the urgency of a
viable solution. The section will focus on a low-level trial court case in
which one member of a lesbian couple sought—unsuccessfully—to
affirm her legal parental relationship with the child born to her wife,
indicative of the types of problems faced by same-sex parents.
Part III will propose that New York courts utilize the Marriage
Equality Act to reinterpret existing statutory and common law in a
gender-neutral manner, and in a way that places same-sex couples on
equal footing with different-sex couples. Rather than altering each
individual statute pertaining to marriage, a broadly worded portion of
lgbt/resources/avoiding-bias.aspx (“In the past, researchers often have assumed that lesbians, gay
men, and bisexuals could not be sampled through probability methods because of their status as
“hidden” minorities in the United States. Recently, however, survey items about sexual behavior
and orientation have been successfully administered to probability samples . . . . These studies
suggest that the problem of nonresponse in surveys of sexual behavior or orientation, although
serious, may not be qualitatively different from that encountered with other samples.”).
4 Same-sex marriage is perhaps the most commonly cited type of recognition sought by
same-sex couples, but other rights varying by state include the ability to visit a significant other in
the hospital, and protections in housing, employment, parenting, and against hate crimes. The
possibility to have some, but not all, of these rights, and the differences in each state, can lead to a
patchwork of laws. See, e.g., Maps of State Laws & Policies, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, http://
www.hrc.org/state_maps (last visited May 22, 2016) (containing maps showing state laws on the
rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender individuals in the context of, inter alia,
employment discrimination, housing discrimination, public accommodation, hate crimes, and
school anti-bullying).
5 Marriage Equality Act, 2011 N.Y. Sess. Laws Ch. 95 (McKinney).

Newman.2016 (Do Not Delete)

80

C A R D OZ O LA W R E V I E W D E • N OV O

5/29/2016 1:13 PM

[2016

the Act functions as a catchall provision and allows later interpreters to
apply it to any relevant gender-specific language or terms. This Note
will propose ways that New York courts should utilize this statute in
order to increase equality between same-sex and different-sex parents.
As examples, this Note proposes the creation of a gender-neutral
“acknowledgment of parentage,” better utilizing the existing marital
presumption of legitimacy, and making use of equitable estoppel in
same-sex couples. Finally, this Part also addresses other potential
remedies for the problem that were rejected as impractical or
undesirable.6
I. CURRENT METHODS OF GAINING LEGAL PARENTAL STATUS
Prior to the legalization of same-sex marriage in some states,
before the practice was legalized nationwide,7 same-sex couples still
needed a method of ensuring that both members of the couple were able
to have a legal relationship with a child they were raising together.8 The
reasons for this are readily apparent. A parent who is a legal stranger
has no rights to make decisions for the child, for example, in the event
of a medical emergency; conversely, the child has no right to benefits,
such as health insurance, through that parent, nor would the child
automatically inherit in the event of that parent’s death.9 Furthermore,
6 For example, proposals such as passing a new law or delegating the problem to the courts
of another state were dismissed as unlikely or impractical. For purposes of this Note, it is
assumed that an individual seeking to ensure that his or her legal rights as a parent are valid will
seek a substantive confirmation, rather than merely a right to seek such a confirmation at a later
date. E.g., Sacha M. Coupet, “Ain’t I A Parent?”: The Exclusion of Kinship Caregivers from the
Debate over Expansions of Parenthood, 34 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 595, 630 (2010)
(“[E]ven in those states where same-sex marriage, domestic partnerships, or the equivalent, are
legal, and where by statute or caselaw [sic] presumptive parentage attaches, same-sex partners of
parents are advised to petition for parental rights through either stepparent or second-parent
adoption.”).
7 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
8 See, e.g., Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood
to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO.
L.J. 459, 468–73 (1990) (discussing the necessity of allowing both members of same-sex couples
to have legal rights to a child, rather than limiting legal rights to the two biological parents).
9 Many of these issues are analogous to those faced by same-sex partners who were
previously unable to marry; those situations are also better documented. See, e.g., Tara ParkerPope, How Hospitals Treat Same-Sex Couples, N.Y. TIMES (May 12, 2009, 12:00 PM), http://
well.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/05/12/how-hospitals-treat-same-sex-couples
(“A
Bakersfield,
Calif., couple rushed their child to the emergency room with a 104 degree fever. The women were
registered domestic partners, but the hospital only allowed the biological mother to stay with the
child. Although hospitals typically allow both parents to stay with a child during treatment, in this
case, the second parent was forced to stay in the waiting room.”); see also Jan Ellen Rein,
Relatives by Blood, Adoption, and Association: Who Should Get What and Why (The Impact of
Adoptions, Adult Adoptions, and Equitable Adoptions on Intestate Succession and Class Gifts),
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should the couple separate, the non-biological parent would have no
standing to seek custody or visitation of the child—though there are
some narrow exceptions.10 These illustrations are merely some of the
examples of privileges and benefits associated with a full and legal
parent/child relationship.
A.

Original Notions of Parental Rights

Historically, the law considered a child born out of wedlock as
“filius nullius,” meaning a child of no one with no legal father. 11 Over
time, the United States Supreme Court began to strike down many laws
that distinguished between those children born to a married couple and
those born out of wedlock.12 Similarly, adopted children were initially
regarded differently from “naturally born” children.13 Today, of course,
adoption is much more widespread in the United States.14 Because two
37 VAND. L. REV. 711, 713 (1984) (“our succession law started with the assumption that
inheritance rights are based on consanguinity [biological relationship] and that any deviation from
this principle requires express authorization either by legislation or by a private dispositive
instrument . . . .”).
10 See, e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 447(a) (McKinney 2014) (“In the absence of an order of
custody or of visitation . . . the court may make an order of custody or of visitation . . . requiring
one parent to permit the other to visit the children at stated periods . . . even where the parents are
divorced and the support order is for a child only.” (emphasis added)). The quoted statute refers
explicitly to parents. Implicit in that is the notion that it is a parent who is entitled to custody or
visitation—someone not considered a legal parent would not be so entitled; see also infra Part I.C
(discussing equitable estoppel).
11 See Brewer’s Lessee v. Blougher, 39 U.S. 178, 197 (1840) (“According to the principles of
the common law, an illegitimate child is filius nullius, and can have no father known to the
law.”); see also SUSAN FRELICH APPLETON & D. KELLY WEISBERG, ADOPTION AND ASSISTED
REPRODUCTION: FAMILIES UNDER CONSTRUCTION 8 (2009).
12 E.g. Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972) (“The status of illegitimacy
has expressed through the ages society’s condemnation of irresponsible liaisons beyond the bonds
of marriage. But visiting this condemnation on the head of an infant is illogical and
unjust. . . . Obviously, no child is responsible for his birth and penalizing the illegitimate child is
an ineffectual—as well as an unjust—way of deterring the parent.”); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
645 (1972) (holding that it is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause for the State to require a
hearing before assuming the custody of children born to married parents, divorced parents, or
unmarried mothers, but to declare children of unmarried fathers dependent without a hearing or
proof of neglect).
13 Stephen B. Presser, The Historical Background of the American Law of Adoption, 11 J.
FAM. L. 443, 501 (1971) (“A sampling of the decisions that interpreted the adoption acts in the
years following their passage shows that courts felt that the rights of adopted children differed
significantly from those that might have been accorded to natural children of the adopting
parents.”). For example, for a time certain intestacy laws provided that an intestate adopted
child’s estate would be given to his natural—not adopted—parents. Id. Similarly, other laws
provided that adopted children were not considered siblings of “natural” children of their adopted
parents and that adopted children were subject to additional taxes not collected from natural
children. Id.
14 The United States Department of Health estimated that nearly 51,000 children were
adopted with the involvement of a public child-welfare agency in the 2013 fiscal year, with nearly
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individuals of the same sex are biologically incapable of conceiving a
child without outside involvement, adoption presents one prominent
option for same-sex couples seeking to raise a child.15
B.

Adoption16

There are two types of adoption typically used by same-sex
couples: stepparent adoptions and second-parent adoptions.17 A
stepparent adoption, in its simplest form, is where a biological parent
remarries—or marries for the first time, if the child was born out of
wedlock—and the new spouse adopts the child, becoming a legal
parent.18 A second-parent adoption is typically defined as a legal
procedure in which an individual adopts a child whom he or she is coparenting, but with whom he or she has no existing legal relationship.19
The main difference between a stepparent adoption and a secondparent adoption is that typically in a stepparent adoption one biological
parent loses his or her legal rights to the child,20 whereas in a secondparent adoption a new adult gains a legal relationship with the child
59,000 more children waiting to be adopted. CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVS., THE AFCARS REPORT 1 (July 2014), http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/
cb/afcarsreport21.pdf. This statistic does not include other types of adoption utilized in the United
States.
15 See, e.g., Sabrina Tavernise, Adoptions by Gay Couples Rise, Despite Barriers, N.Y. TIMES
(June 13, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/14/us/14adoption.html.
16 For a general history of adoptions, see Presser, supra note 13.
17 For an earlier look at same-sex adoption, see Ralph C. Brashier, Children and Inheritance
in the Nontraditional Family, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 93, 160 (1996) (“In their efforts to establish
legally recognized relationships among themselves and their children, homosexual families are
increasingly turning to adoption laws.”). Though it is not discussed further in this Note, some
jurisdictions allow more than two individuals to be legal parents to a child. E.g., CAL. FAM. CODE
§ 7612(c) (West 2014) (“a court may find that more than two persons with a claim to
parentage . . . are parents”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-201 (West 2013) (allowing de facto
parents); D.C. CODE § 16-831.01 (2012) (allowing de facto parents, including in situations where
there are two existing parents); Jacob v. Shultz-Jacob, 923 A.2d 473, 475–76, 481–82 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 2007) (affirming the trial court’s custody order, which granted shared custody to three adults).
See generally Laura Nicole Althouse, Three’s Company? How American Law Can Recognize A
Third Social Parent in Same-Sex Headed Families, 19 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 171 (2008); Ann
E. Kinsey, Comment, A Modern King Solomon’s Dilemma: Why State Legislatures Should Give
Courts the Discretion to Find That A Child Has More Than Two Legal Parents, 51 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 295 (2014).
18 Under common law, the stepparent does not have a legal relationship to the child, unless
there is an affirmative adoptive process, all other things being equal. See Bartlett, supra note 2, at
912–13 (“Under the common law, the stepparent-stepchild relationship does not itself give rise to
any legal rights or obligations. For example, the stepparent need not support his stepchild or
accept the child into his home.”).
19 ARTHUR S. LEONARD & PATRICIA A. CAIN, SEXUALITY LAW 419 (2005).
20 See, e.g., Margaret M. Mahoney, Stepparents As Third Parties in Relation to Their
Stepchildren, 40 FAM. L.Q. 81, 85 (2006); APPLETON & WEISBERG, supra note 11, at 177;
Brashier, supra note 17, at 155.
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without either of the existing legal parents having to lose any parental
rights.21 Additionally, whereas in many second-parent adoptions the two
parents often plan to start the family together prior to the birth of the
child,22 a classic stepparent adoption is inherently one in which the new
parent begins parenting the child later than the other co-parent.23
Furthermore, in a second-parent adoption, the new parent does not need
to have a legal relationship—such as marriage—with the existing
parent.24
The most basic adoption scheme is often called a “stranger”
paradigm, and can be seen as a precursor to a stepparent adoption
because in a stranger adoption both biological parents lose their right to
the child.25 This is meant to apply to situations in which a child is
completely removed from his or her birth parents—hence the term
“stranger.”26 In order to permit stepparent adoptions,27 an exception is
created to that stranger paradigm in which only one parent’s rights are
terminated, allowing the other parent to continue to have a legal
relationship with the child, and allowing the stepparent to gain legal

21 See COURTNEY G. JOSLIN, SHANNON P. MINTER, & CATHERINE SAKIMURA, LESBIAN,
GAY, BISEXUAL AND TRANSGENDER FAMILY LAW § 5:3 (2015); LEONARD & CAIN, supra note
19, at 419.
22 See JOSLIN ET AL., supra note 21, § 5:3.
23 Id.
24 E.g., Sharon S. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., San Diego Cnty., 73 P.3d 554 (Cal. 2003), cert.
denied, 540 U.S. 1220 (2004) (denying a petition for certiorari and thereby allowing to stand a
California Supreme Court decision allowing a former domestic partner to complete a secondparent adoption of a child conceived during the partnership). See generally Ann K. Wooster,
Adoption of Child by Same-Sex Partners, 61 A.L.R. 6th 1 (2011); JOSLIN ET AL., supra note 21,
§ 5:3.
25 See, e.g., N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 117(2)(a) (McKinney 2014) (“[A]fter the making of an
order of adoption, adopted children and their issue thereafter are strangers to any birth relatives
for the purpose of the interpretation or construction of a disposition in any instrument . . . .”);
Peter Wendel, Inheritance Rights and the Step-Partner Adoption Paradigm: Shades of the
Discrimination Against Illegitimate Children, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 351, 361–64 (2005);
APPLETON & WEISBERG, supra note 11, at 176–77; Bartlett, supra note 2, at 893–94 (“Adoption
severs the relationship between the child and the natural parents, who become legal ‘strangers.’”).
26 WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & NAN D. HUNTER, SEXUALITY, GENDER, AND THE LAW 834
(3d ed. 2011).
27 Stepparent adoptions are considered to be desirable in the sense that they allow the parent
who is actually raising the child—and is married to one of the biological parents—to have a legal
relationship with the child. E.g., In re Estate of Seaman, 543 N.Y.S.2d 252, 254–55 (Sur. Ct.
1989) aff’d 559 N.Y.S.2d 216 (App. Div. 1990), rev’d on other grounds 583 N.E.2d 294 (N.Y.
1991) (explaining that an intestate individual likely wants his or her estate to be distributed to
close relatives regardless of whether the relationship is through biology or due to adoption).
Under common law, without the benefit of a stepparent adoption, the stepparent has no legal
rights deriving from the child, nor obligations to him. See Bartlett, supra note 2, at 912–13
(“Under the common law, the stepparent-stepchild relationship does not itself give rise to any
legal rights or obligations. For example, the stepparent need not support his stepchild or accept
the child into his home. A stepfather may not give his name to his stepchild if the natural father
objects, and usually a stepchild cannot inherit from his stepparent.” (footnotes omitted)).
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parental status over the child as well.28 In other words, one biological
parent loses his or her legal rights to the child, and a new adult gains
legal rights.
As an example of a stepparent adoption, suppose Parent A and
Parent B are married with a child. After Parents A and B divorce, then
Parent A marries Parent C. Finally, Parent C adopts the child, gaining
full parental rights. However, Parent B loses his or her parental rights in
the process.29
When applied to same-sex couples, a stepparent adoption becomes
more complicated.30 In recent years, same-sex couples who are in
jurisdictions that permit same-sex marriage, or similar legal
relationships, have become able to utilize stepparent adoptions in the
same way a different-sex couple would.31 However, pre-Obergefell,
couples in jurisdictions without legal recognition of same-sex
relationships could not take advantage of this type of adoption,32 and
there was a gray area in which some jurisdictions that recognized samesex domestic partnerships or other legal relationships—but not samesex marriage—allowed same-sex couples to utilize stepparent
adoptions.33
28 See, e.g., David M. Cotter, Current Trends in Second-Parent Adoptions, 17 No. 9 DIVORCE
LITIG. 141 (2005); Wendel, supra note 25, at 364–68.
29 See, e.g., Linda D. Elrod, Stepparent Adoption, 1 KAN. LAW & PRAC., Family Law § 6:3
(“Often a stepparent adoption occurs when a widowed parent remarries. A more difficult scenario
arises when a divorced parent wants a new spouse to adopt the child to formalize the family.”).
30 For example, in a common same-sex parenting arrangement there may be three parents—
two birth parents, and the same-sex partner of one of those parents. Depending on each person’s
wishes, it may be difficult to ensure that everyone has the legal rights they desire, since in a
stepparent adoption a biological parent would have to give up his or her legal rights to the child.
E.g., Gary, supra note 2, at 32–33 (“For same-sex committed partners, if one partner seeks to
adopt his or her partner’s child, the couple may find that the adoptive mother’s (or father’s) legal
tie to the child will cut off the biological mother’s (or father’s) legal connection.”). A perhaps
obvious, but important, note is that much of the complication in this area derives from the fact
that same-sex couples are utilizing and adapting systems intended for different-sex couples. See,
e.g., Coupet, supra note 6, at 628 (“The form of parental rights for partners of parents in same-sex
relationships—and also the subsequent confusion over their parental status—comes from the
application of default rules based on heterosexual marital norms. That is, the more that same-sex
couples can look like a traditional heterosexual married couple or stepfamily, the more likely that
a same-sex partner will obtain parental rights.”).
31 E.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 9000(g) (West 2014) (stating that domestic partners can utilize
stepparent adoptions procedures); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:1-31(e) (West 2014) (“The rights of civil
union couples with respect to a child of whom either becomes the parent during the term of the
civil union, shall be the same as those of a married couple with respect to a child of whom either
spouse or partner in a civil union couple becomes the parent during the marriage.”).
32 E.g., In re Adoption of Baby Z., 724 A.2d 1035 (Conn. 1999) (finding, inter alia, that the
Connecticut stepparent adoption statute was not meant to apply to an unmarried same-sex
couple).
33 See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 26.33.902 (2015) (“For the purposes of this [adoption]
chapter, the term[] spouse . . . shall be interpreted as applying equally to state registered domestic
partnerships or individuals in state registered domestic partnerships . . . .”); In re M.M.D., 662
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As mentioned above, the other main type of adoption utilized by
same-sex couples is called a second-parent adoption.34 Stepparent
adoptions are often preferable to second-parent adoptions, in part
because they frequently are less costly: second-parent adoptions can
require expensive home studies before the adoption is approved,
whereas stepparent adoptions do not.35
Stepparent adoptions are seen as having laid the groundwork for
second-parent adoptions.36 As mentioned above, in a second-parent
adoption the adopting parent has no preexisting legal relationship with
the child,37 and, unlike in a stepparent adoption, neither existing parent
loses a legal relationship with the child.38 One more key difference is
that in a second-parent adoption, the new parent does not need to have a
legal relationship with the existing parent.39 It is this latter difference
that makes second-parent adoptions so valuable to same-sex couples: it
allows couples to gain joint legal parentage over a child without having
to be in a jurisdiction that recognizes same-sex marriage. Though still
relevant today, this was even more important prior to the legalization of
same-sex marriage, as second-parent adoptions were granted long
before same-sex marriage was legalized anywhere in the country. 40
However, second-parent adoptions are not available in all states.41 Some
A.2d 837, 841 (D.C. 1995) (holding that members of a same-sex couple which “have committed
themselves to each other as a family to the extent legally possible” were eligible to petition the
court for a decree of adoption, despite being unmarried).
34 See JOSLIN ET AL., supra note 21, § 5:3 (“The most common means by which nonbiological LGBT co-parents can establish their legal parentage is through a ‘second parent’ or
‘co-parent’ adoption.”).
35 See, e.g., N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 421.15 (providing that authorized
adoption agencies shall, inter alia, conduct at least one home visit). New York regulations
provide that the adoption study process, of which the home visit is a part, shall examine many
different characteristics of prospective parents, including their ability to care for a child, their
health, age, and family composition. Id. at § 421.16; see also Mahoney, supra note 20. For
example, California’s statute imposes a maximum cost of $700 on prospective adoptive parent in
a stepparent adoption, but a cost of $4,500 in an “independent” adoption. CAL. FAM. CODE
§ 9002 (West 2015); CAL. FAM. CODE § 8810(a)(1) (West 2015).
36 See Patricia J. Falk, Second-Parent Adoption, 48 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 93, 95 (2000); Julie
Shapiro, A Lesbian-Centered Critique of Second-Parent Adoptions, 14 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J.
17, 28 (1999).
37 Leonard & Cain, supra note 19, at 419.
38 Id. This is often compared to a stepparent adoption, as both share the feature of one of the
parents retaining all of his or her rights. But a second-parent adoption does not necessarily
terminate an individual’s parental rights. See JOSLIN ET AL., supra note 21, § 5:3.
39 E.g., Sharon S. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., San Diego Cnty., 31 Cal. 4th 417 (Cal. 2013), cert.
denied, 540 U.S. 1220 (2004). See generally Wooster, supra note 24; JOSLIN ET AL., supra note
21, § 5:3.
40 Jane S. Schacter, Sexual Orientation, Social Change, and the Courts, 54 DRAKE L. REV.
861, 876 (2006) (“Beginning at least as early as 1985, trial courts in Oregon and Alaska construed
their respective state adoption statutes to permit second-parent lesbian adoptions.”).
41 See Statewide Non-Discrimination in Adoption Laws, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, http://
www.hrc.org/map/pdf?tid=25 (last updated Jan. 7, 2016) (showing two states, Mississippi and
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states explicitly prohibit the practice by statute.42 Several other states
have court rulings prohibiting second-parent adoptions,43 though these
rulings are potentially subject to reinterpretation in light of Obergefell.
Prior to the Supreme Court decision in Obergefell, when same-sex
marriage was not legal in all states, before determining which types of
adoption were permitted by a state, same-sex couples had to ensure that
adoption by same-sex couples—or even by lesbian, gay, or bisexual
individuals—was allowed in the first place.44 For example, the Ohio
Supreme Court held in In re Adoption of Charles B.45 that while an
unmarried gay man was within the contemplated definition of the state’s
adoption statute and therefore statutorily permitted to adopt,46 the
decision to allow him to do so was discretionary, to be determined on a
case-by-case basis.47 The court additionally made it a point to mention
that “immoral conduct”—meaning sexual conduct between unmarried
individuals—could be taken into account in adoption or custody
proceedings if it was shown to have an adverse impact on the child.48 Of
course, at that time any same-sex sexual activity was inherently
considered immoral, as same-sex marriage was not legal in the state,
and so all sexual activity between persons of the same sex was
Nebraska, as “refusing to comply with non-discrimination in adoption” and the majority of states
as having unknown policies).
42 E.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-17-3(5) (West 2015) (“Adoption by couples of the same
gender is prohibited.”). However, it is important to note that recent developments may affect the
interpretation of these statutes. For example, a case challenging Mississippi’s ban on same-sex
marriage was ultimately decided in favor of the plaintiffs in light of Obergefell, but the suit only
addressed statutes pertaining to marriage, not to adoption. Campaign for S. Equal. v. Bryant, 791
F.3d 625 (5th Cir. 2015).
43 An intermediate-appellate Kansas court held that “if an unmarried individual wishes to
adopt a child, the birth parents of the child are required to relinquish all parental rights to the
child.” In re Adoption of I.M., 288 P.3d 864, 868 (Kan. Ct. App. 2012). The potential implication
of this is that a woman who gives birth to a child would have to renounce her parental rights in
order for her partner to adopt the child. The Nebraska Supreme Court reached a similar
conclusion. B.P. v. State (In re Luke), 640 N.W.2d 374, 383 (Neb. 2002) (“With the exception of
a stepparent adoption . . . when the parent or parents’ rights have not been terminated, a child
must be relinquished by the existing parent or parents to be eligible for adoption . . . .”); see also
Georgina G. v. Terry M. (In re Interest of Angel Lace M.), 516 N.W.2d 678, 684 (Wis. 1994)
(holding that a same-sex co-parent was prohibited from adopting a child by statute, despite a trial
court ruling that the adoption was in the best interests of the child).
44 See, e.g., William E. Adams, Jr., Whose Family Is It Anyway? The Continuing Struggle for
Lesbians and Gay Men Seeking to Adopt Children, 30 NEW ENG. L. REV. 579 (1996); Joseph
Evall, Sexual Orientation and Adoptive Matching, 25 FAM. L.Q. 347 (1991); Devjani Mishra, The
Road to Concord: Resolving the Conflict of Law Over Adoption by Gays and Lesbians, 30
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 91 (1996).
45 552 N.E.2d 884 (Ohio 1990).
46 The court found the petitioner to meet the definition of an “unmarried adult,” which is one
of the categories of persons allowed to adopt under Ohio statute. Id. at 886; see also OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 3107.03(B) (West 2014).
47 In re Charles B., 552 N.E.2d at 886.
48 Id. at 888.
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unavoidably extramarital.49
Even after the Obergefell decision the legality of same-sex
adoption is unclear in many states.50 In the wake of the Supreme Court’s
decision the effects on adoption laws are still in flux, with some courts
still making adverse decisions based on prospective parents’ same-sex
relationships.51
C.

Equitable Estoppel

Outside the realm of same-sex parenting, New York courts have
long looked to the best interests of a child in making determinations in
areas like parental rights and custody, even where parents did not utilize
any type of adoption.52 At times, this has resulted in decisions granting
parental rights to individuals with no biological or preexisting legal
relationship to a child. This is often accomplished through a doctrine
called equitable estoppel,53 or sometimes de facto parenting.54 The
49 The Ohio ban on same-sex marriage was later codified. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3101.01(C) (West 2014) (“Any marriage between persons of the same sex is against the strong
public policy of this state. Any marriage between persons of the same sex shall have no legal
force or effect in this state and, if attempted to be entered into in this state, is void ab initio and
shall not be recognized by this state.”). This was one of the statutes directly challenged—and
ultimately abrogated—in Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
50 See generally Rebecca Beitsch, Despite Same-Sex Marriage Ruling, Gay Adoption Rights
Uncertain in Some States, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS (Aug. 19, 2015), http://www.pewtrusts.org/
en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2015/08/19/despite-same-sex-marriage-ruling-gayadoption-rights-uncertain-in-some-states. Further, the effects of the Obergefell decision, even
solely within the realm of marriage, are still not yet completely clear. For example, the District
Court for the District of Puerto Rico held that, because Obergefell discussed its application to
"states," the opinion did not bind the territory of Puerto Rico. Conde Vidal v. Garcia-Padilla, No.
CV 14-1253 (PG), 2016 WL 901899 (D.P.R. Mar. 8, 2016). The First Circuit quickly took
exception to this interpretation, overruling the judge and removing him from the case altogether.
In re Conde Vidal, No. 16-1313, 2016 WL 1391897 (1st Cir. Apr. 7, 2016). A similar
interpretation battle is playing out in Alabama. See, e.g., Campbell Robertson, Roy Moore,
Alabama Judge, Suspended Over Gay Marriage Stance, N.Y. TIMES (May 6, 2016), http://
www.nytimes.com/2016/05/07/us/judge-roy-moore-alabama-same-sex-marriage.html.
51 See, e.g., Justin Wm. Moyer, Utah Judge Removes Lesbian Couple’s Foster Child, Says
She’ll Be Better Off With Heterosexuals, WASH. POST (Nov. 12, 2015), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2015/11/12/utah-judge-removes-foster-childfrom-lesbian-couple-saying-shell-be-better-off-with-heterosexuals.
52 E.g., Eschbach v. Eschbach, 436 N.E.2d 1260, 1262 (N.Y 1982) (“Any court in
considering questions of child custody must make every effort to determine what is for the best
interest of the child, and what will best promote its welfare and happiness.”); Bennett v. Jeffreys,
356 N.E.2d 277, 281 (N.Y. 1976) (“[I]n [an] extraordinary circumstance, when there is a conflict,
the best interest of the child has always been regarded as superior to the right of parental
custody.”); Ex parte Lee, 116 N.E. 352, 354 (N.Y. 1917) (“[I]t was the duty of the court in a
proceeding involving the custody of the child to look solely to his welfare and to decide
accordingly.”).
53 See, e.g., ESKRIDGE & HUNTER, supra note 26, at 809 (defining parenthood by estoppel as
a situation in which “the state will treat an adult as a legal parent when the adult is (i) is obligated
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doctrine is traditionally used—at least within New York—in situations
where a man mistakenly believes himself to be a child’s biological
father, and after acting as a parent, discovers that another man is in fact
the biological father, but nevertheless wishes to continue parenting the
child.55 However, it is not difficult to adapt the concept to same-sex
couples and their children.56
The New York Court of Appeals has held that equitable estoppel
can be used to preserve an existing parent-child relationship, even if that
relationship is not biological in nature.57 In determining a child’s best
interests, New York courts have often used the notion that an
individual’s involvement as a parent is more important than an actual
biological relationship with the child.58
to pay child support or (ii) lived with the child for two or more years and had a good-faith belief
that he was the child’s father or (iii) lived with the child since the child’s birth and accepted full
responsibilities as a parent as part of a co-parenting agreement to raise the child together and the
court finds that recognition of such responsibility is in the child’s best interests or (iv) lived with
the child for two or more years and accepted parenting responsibilities pursuant to a co-parenting
agreement with the child’s legal parent(s) and the court finds that recognition of such
responsibilities is in the child’s best interests.”); Brashier, supra note 17, at 172 (“Most states
recognize that circumstances may warrant treating a child as an adopted child even when the
adoptive parents fail to comply with the statutory adoption procedures. A so-called equitable
adoption or adoption by estoppel may occur, for example, when the adoptive parent agrees to
adopt the child, actually rears the child and holds it out as his own, and the child mistakenly
believes it has been properly adopted.” (footnote omitted)). The New York Court of Appeals has
stated that:
The purpose of equitable estoppel is to preclude a person from asserting a right after
having led another to form the reasonable belief that the right would not be asserted,
and loss or prejudice to the other would result if the right were asserted. . . . Its purpose
is to prevent someone from enforcing rights that would work injustice on the person
against whom enforcement is sought and who, while justifiably relying on the
opposing party’s actions, has been misled into a detrimental change of position.
Shondel J. v. Mark D, 853 N.E.2d 610, 613 (N.Y. 2006).
54 See ESKRIDGE & HUNTER, supra note 26, at 809 (“De Facto Parenting, whereby the state
will provide some legal rights to an adult who lived with the child for two or more years and for
non-financial reasons and with the agreement of the legal parent(s) or as a result of their
failure/inability to perform caretaking functions regularly performed a majority of the caretaking
functions for the child or regularly performed a share of caretaking functions at least as great as
that performed by the parent with whom the child primarily lived.”); see also V.C. v. M.J.B., 748
A.2d 539 (N.J. 2000) (allowing and explaining “psychological parents”).
55 E.g., Samantha T. v. Jeffrey S.K., 2012 WL 3156443, at *2 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. Aug. 3, 2012)
(“The usual situation is where the father is told falsely that the child is his . . . .”).
56 Just as a man can parent a child to whom he is not biologically related—albeit
unwittingly—a same-sex partner of either gender can parent a child to whom he or she is not
biologically related. The difference is that in the former instance the man mistakenly believes
himself to be the biological father, whereas in the latter case the parent is aware that he or she is
not biologically related.
57 Shondel J., 853 N.E.2d at 615 (“It is true that a child in a support proceeding has an interest
in finding out the identity of her biological father. But in many instances a child also has an
interest—no less powerful—in maintaining her relationship with the man who led her to believe
that he is her father.”).
58 E.g., Savel v. Shields, 872 N.Y.S.2d 597, 598–99 (App. Div. 2009) (denying genetic
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In one prominent example of this phenomenon, the New York
Court of Appeals applied a fairly broad standard—in Shondel J. v. Mark
D.59—and held that the best interests of the child governed, even over
biological relationships.60 The court held that a child had a strong
interest in maintaining a parent/child relationship with a man who acted
as her father, despite not actually being related to the child. 61 However,
Shondel’s broad holding was later narrowed when the New York Court
of Appeals stated in Debra H. v. Janice R. that Shondel’s holding was
limited to the procedure for determining paternity for purposes of child
support, as distinct from being used to determine visitation or custody
arrangements.62 Debra H. involved two female members of a same-sex
couple who had been raising a child together.63 The couple subsequently
separated, and the non-biological mother was fighting for custody of the
child.64
The court in Debra H. distinguished between determining paternity
for purposes of ordering child support, and determining paternity for
purposes of ordering custody or visitation.65 Under the court’s
reasoning, this distinction was intended to prevent a man from shirking
his assumed responsibility as a parent, regardless of whether he was
biologically related to the child.66 However, though the court did not
want the man to be able to abandon the child, the court also did not
want the man to be able to claim a parental relationship if the mother—
the biological parent—objected.67 In other words, a man who is not
biologically related to the child whom he has been raising can be forced
to pay child support, but he is not guaranteed to have the same custody
testing as against the child’s best interests in order to “preserve the established father-child
relationship” where the petitioner signed an acknowledgment of paternity and acted as the child’s
only father figure); Gina L. v. David W., 826 N.Y.S.2d 338, 338–39 (App. Div. 2006) (“Where a
child justifiably relies on the representations of a man that he is his or her father with the result
that the child will be harmed by the man’s denial of paternity, the man may be estopped from
asserting that denial.”); Enrique G. v. Lisbet E., 769 N.Y.S.2d 533, 534 (App. Div. 2003) (“[I]t
would be detrimental to the interests of the child, six years of age at the time of the Family Court
proceedings, to countenance the disruption of her close relationship with petitioner, whom she
has always known and loved as her father.”); Lorie F v. Raymond F, 657 N.Y.S.2d 235, 236
(App. Div. 1997) (denying genetic testing on the grounds that “injustice will result if petitioner is
permitted to compel respondent to undergo a blood-grouping test and definitively establish that
the only father the child has known throughout her entire life is not in fact her father.”).
59 853 N.E.2d 610.
60 Id. at 615.
61 Id.
62 Debra H. v. Janice R., 930 N.E.2d 184, 191 (N.Y. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 908
(2011).
63 Id. at 186.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 191.
66 Id.
67 Id.
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or visitation rights as a biological father. This holding has largely been
enforced by lower courts.68 Thus, the decision implies that nonbiological parents, including those in same-sex couples, cannot rely on
equitable estoppel to protect their parental rights.
For example, in P. v. B.,69 a man who had acted as the father to two
children—but was not biologically related to them—attempted to use
equitable estoppel to establish paternity. 70 The Family Court cautioned
that the Court of Appeals applied equitable estoppel on a case-by-case
basis, and ultimately held that that case fell within the purview of Debra
H. and therefore the non-biological father could not utilize equitable
estoppel in his petition.71
D.

Presumption of Legitimacy

After New York passed its same-sex marriage equality statute in
June 2011, same-sex couples gained many, if not all, of the same rights
as different-sex couples.72 Among those rights was the marital
presumption of “legitimacy”; this is a presumption that when a child is
born to a married couple, that child is the child of both members of the
couple.73 The presumption of legitimacy is a valuable right to same-sex
couples;74 once they have married, any subsequent children are
68 See, e.g., White v. Wilcox, 973 N.Y.S.2d 498 (App. Div. 2013), appeal dismissed in part,
denied in part, 4 N.E.3d 970 (N.Y. 2014); Palmatier v. Dane, 948 N.Y.S.2d 181, 182 (App. Div.
2012). However, there are some exceptions, such as instances of judicial estoppel. E.g., Estrellita
A. v. Jennifer D., 963 N.Y.S.2d 843 (Fam. Ct. 2013) (denying respondent’s motion to dismiss a
custody and visitation petition because respondent had previously represented petitioner as the
child’s parent in order to obtain child support).
69 906 N.Y.S.2d 865 (Fam. Ct. 2010).
70 Id. at 865–66.
71 Id. at 870 (“[T]he Court of Appeals has so far approved of applying the doctrine of
equitable estoppel with respect to paternity related issues in particularized instances determined
on a case by case basis.”).
72 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 10-a(2) (McKinney 2015); Nicholas Confessore & Michael
Barbaro, New York Allows Same-Sex Marriage, Becoming Largest State to Pass Law, N.Y. TIMES
(June 24, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/25/nyregion/gay-marriage-approved-by-newyork-senate.html.
73 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 24(1) (“A child heretofore or hereafter born of parents who prior
or subsequent to the birth of such child shall have entered into a civil or religious marriage, or
shall have consummated a common-law marriage where such marriage is recognized as valid, in
the manner authorized by the law of the place where such marriage takes place, is the legitimate
child of both birth parents . . . .”); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 417 (McKinney 2015) (“A child born of
parents who at any time prior or subsequent to the birth of said child shall have entered into a
ceremonial marriage shall be deemed the legitimate child of both parents for all purposes of this
article . . . .”).
74 Though outside the focus of this Note, it may be worth examining whether the presumption
of legitimacy is still relevant in either same-sex or different-sex relationships. The presumption of
legitimacy was originally based on biology: before paternity tests were easily available, a
woman’s husband was considered the most likely father of her child. See Marjorie Maguire
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presumed to be “legitimate,” granting both parents legal rights and
eliminating the need for costly legal procedures such as second-parent
adoptions.75 However, given that the legality of same-sex parenting is
still being litigated in some states,76 there remains a possibility that a
state other than New York might not recognize the legal relationship
resulting from a presumption of legitimacy. 77 Because of this
uncertainty, some couples understandably look to take additional legal
steps to ensure their legal rights to their children are protected.78 This
will be discussed further below.79
E.

Acknowledgment of Paternity

One of the additional steps to establish one’s legal parental rights is
the acknowledgment of paternity, the procedures for which are set forth
in New York Family Court Act section 516-a.80 An acknowledgment of
paternity is defined as a document in which both parents agree that the
father listed on the document is the only possible biological father; this
Shultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based Parenthood: An Opportunity for Gender
Neutrality, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 297, 316–18 (1990). The continued existence of the presumption
arguably implies that there is a policy decision in favoring traditional family structures, even
though the technology exists to definitively determine a child’s biological parents. Id. But see
Camilla Taylor & Kyle Palazzolo, Opinion, It’s Not Marriage Equality Until Same-Sex Parents
Both Appear On Birth Certificates, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 26, 2015 7:15 AM), http://
www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/oct/26/its-not-marriage-equality-until-same-sexparents-both-appear-on-birth-certificates (“The states that continue to fight [same-sex] families in
court argue that birth certificates are a proxy for biology, and that the members of a same-sex
couple can’t both be biologically related to their child.”); see also infra Part III.A.2.
75 See supra Part I.B.
76 See Taylor & Palazzolo, supra note 74.
77 See, e.g., Susan Frelich Appleton, Presuming Women: Revisiting the Presumption of
Legitimacy in the Same-Sex Couples Era, 86 B.U. L. REV. 227, 290 (2006) (“This vulnerability to
challenge in other states, however, presents a problem . . . [for] those who rely on a default rule,
like the presumption of legitimacy, which some jurisdictions might choose not to respect.”);
Barbara J. Cox, Adoptions by Lesbian and Gay Parents Must Be Recognized by Sister States
Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause Despite Anti-Marriage Statutes That Discriminate
Against Same-Sex Couples, 31 CAP. U. L. REV. 751 (2003) (arguing that same-sex adoption
should be fully recognized by other states, but acknowledging that this is not always the case). As
an illustrative example, months after the Obergefell decision Arkansas officials refused to list the
names of both same-sex parents on a child’s birth certificate, leaving the parents to seek
recognition through the state court system. Steve Barnes, Arkansas Supreme Court Halts Birth
Certificates for Same-Sex Partners, REUTERS (Dec. 10, 2015, 10:24 PM), http://www.reuters.
com/article/us-arkansas-gaymarriage-idUSKBN0TT35U20151211.
78 E.g., In re Seb C-M, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 31, 2014, at 1 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. Jan. 6, 2014) (“The
petitioner appears to have filed the instant application out of an abundance of caution, perhaps to
ensure that, with the support of judicial imprimatur, her existing parental relationship with the
infant is less susceptible to challenge in the event of the family’s re-location to a jurisdiction less
hospitable to the rights of same-sex couples to marry and adopt children.”).
79 See infra Part II.
80 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 516-a (McKinney 2014).
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document has the same legal effect as a court order declaring
parentage.81 Furthermore, an order of filiation82 can result from an
acknowledgment of paternity, and that court order is presumptively
subject to full faith and credit83 by courts in other jurisdictions.84
Should an acknowledgment of paternity be used in the context of
same-sex couples, one issue that may arise is an allegation of fraud85—
in this context, fraud might be interpreted as acknowledging paternity
while knowing that there is no biological relationship between a parent
and child. For example, suppose a male same-sex couple conceived a
child using Partner A’s sperm and an anonymously donated egg, and the
egg is implanted in a surrogate. The couple could sign an
acknowledgment of paternity stating that Partner B—who did not
donate sperm—is the father. If that couple later separates, in an attempt
to revoke Partner B’s parental rights, Partner A might allege fraud,
stating that Partner B fraudulently signed the acknowledgment despite
knowing that he was not biologically the child’s father. On the other
hand, Partner B could make the same allegation in an effort to avoid his
parental responsibilities.86 The ability of either partner to challenge the
acknowledgment is one example of the need to update this type of
81 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4135-b(1)(a) (McKinney 2015) (“[T]he signing of the
acknowledgment of paternity by both parties shall have the same force and effect as an order of
filiation entered after a court hearing by a court of competent jurisdiction . . . .”).
82 An order of filiation is a judicial declaration of paternity. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 542(a)
(McKinney 2015) (“If the court finds the male party is the father of the child, it shall make an
order of filiation, declaring paternity.”).
83 Full Faith and Credit is derived from Article IV of the United States Constitution, the first
section of which reads: “Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts,
Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws
prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the
Effect thereof.” U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. It is also codified in federal statute. 28 U.S.C. § 1738
(2012) (“Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies thereof, so authenticated, shall
have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States and its Territories and
Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory or Possession from
which they are taken.”). See, e.g., McDonald v. City of W. Branch, Mich., 466 U.S. 284, 287
(1984) (“Our cases establish that § 1738 obliges federal courts to give the same preclusive effect
to a state-court judgment as would the courts of the State rendering the judgment.”).
84 See In re Sebastian, 879 N.Y.S.2d 677, 692 (Sur. Ct. 2009) (stating that of three options
available to a parent, “first, to be listed on [the child’s] birth certificate; second . . . to execute a
statutorily prescribed acknowledgment of paternity [filiation]; and third, to obtain a judicial order
of filiation. Only the last of these is presumptively subject to Full Faith and Credit.”); see also 42
U.S.C. § 666(a)(11) (2012) (“Procedures under which a State must give full faith and credit to a
determination of paternity made by any other State, whether established through voluntary
acknowledgment or through administrative or judicial processes.”); 45 C.F.R. § 302.70(a)(11)
(2015) (same).
85 An allegation of fraud is one of the ways in which a signatory to an acknowledgment of
paternity can challenge the acknowledgment. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 516-a(b)(iv). The other ways
are by alleging duress or material mistake of fact. Id.
86 For a similar situation, see, e.g., Felton R. v. Gloria P., 880 N.Y.S.2d 475 (App. Div.
2009); Demetrius H. v. Mikhaila C.M., 827 N.Y.S.2d 810 (App. Div. 2006).
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procedure to be fully applicable to same-sex couples.
For purposes of rescission of an acknowledgement of paternity,
courts have held that a petitioner father did not make a prima facie
showing of fraud in cases in which the petitioner father knew, at the
time of signing the acknowledgment, that he was not in fact the
biological father of the child.87 Applying the same logic to the example
above, the non-biological father could not allege fraud in an attempt to
rescind the acknowledgment and thereby avoid parental responsibilities.
Though less common, the inverse argument has been accepted as
well: namely, if a mother knew, upon signing an acknowledgment of
paternity, that the other signatory was not the biological father, then she
cannot make a prima facie argument of fraud on that basis.88 For
example, in Samantha T. v. Jeffrey S.K.,89 the male defendant signed an
affidavit asserting that he had fathered the female plaintiff’s child,
despite both individuals knowing that this was untrue.90 In that case, the
Family Court stated that New York’s statute regarding acknowledgment
of paternity was not meant to refer to a situation in which both “parents”
signed such an acknowledgment despite knowing that the father was not
actually related to the child.91 Rather, it was meant to apply to the more
typical situation in which a man is incorrectly told that he is biologically
related to a child.92 Under that reasoning, in the example above, the
biological father could not successfully allege fraud against the nonbiological father, since both signatories knew that the non-biological
father was unrelated to the child when they signed the acknowledgment
of paternity.
Finally, as the court notes, a mother’s claim in the situation
discussed in Samantha T. is hypocritical, as the mother is presumably
just as complicit in any fraud as the biological father when she signed
the acknowledgment of paternity.93 Furthermore, a court may take into
consideration the fact that signatories are apprised of the responsibilities
conferred by signing an acknowledgment of paternity. 94 Thus, based on
this chain of logic, a court might accept a same-sex couple’s
acknowledgment of paternity or maternity, regardless of biological
relation.

87
88
89
90
91
92
93

See, e.g., Felton R., 880 N.Y.S.2d 475; Demetrius H., 827 N.Y.S.2d 810.
Samantha T. v. Jeffrey S.K., 2012 WL 3156443, at *2 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. Aug. 3, 2012).
Id.
Id. at *1.
Id. at *2.
Id. (“The usual situation is where the father is told falsely that the child is his.”).
Id. (“[P]etitioner’s claim hypocritically ignores the fact that petitioner was equally
fraudulent when she signed the acknowledgment.”).
94 S.E.R. v. M.S.C., 845 N.Y.S.2d 701, 705 (Fam. Ct. 2007).
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New York’s Marriage Equality Act

The legalization of marriage between two individuals of the same
sex has important implications for same-sex parenting, especially for
the presumption of legitimacy discussed above. New York’s Marriage
Equality Act was passed in June 2011,95 and, inter alia, amended
section 10-a of the Domestic Relations Laws.96 The first part of section
10-a legalized same-sex marriage in the state.97 The second part of the
statute is somewhat less straightforward; it purportedly provides all
rights and benefits to same-sex couples—in the context of marriage—
that are available to different-sex couples, and provides that “genderspecific language or terms shall be construed in a gender-neutral
manner” where necessary.98 It is this latter section that is open to
interpretation—the statute does not specify a particular section of
gender-specific language to be modified, but rather modifies all
“necessary” gender-specific language in the context of marriage.99 As
the statute is phrased broadly, later courts—as well as administrative
agencies and any other state bodies that interpret marriage laws—are
likely to examine the legislative intent in determining whether to
reexamine gender-specific language in light of the Act.100
95 Marriage Equality Act, 2011 N.Y. Sess. Laws Ch. 95 (McKinney). The Act became
effective thirty days later in July 2011. Id.
96 The Act also amended or created three other sections of the Domestic Relation Law. Id.
These other changes referred primarily to exceptions for religious organizations, and also slightly
changed the language of the statute governing marriage licenses. Id.; see also N.Y. DOM. REL.
LAW §§ 10-b, 11, 13 (McKinney 2014).
97 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 10-a(1) (“A marriage that is otherwise valid shall be valid
regardless of whether the parties to the marriage are of the same or different sex.”).
98 The full text of the section reads:

No government treatment or legal status, effect, right, benefit, privilege, protection or
responsibility relating to marriage, whether deriving from statute, administrative or
court rule, public policy, common law or any other source of law, shall differ based on
the parties to the marriage being or having been of the same sex rather than a different
sex. When necessary to implement the rights and responsibilities of spouses under the
law, all gender-specific language or terms shall be construed in a gender-neutral
manner in all such sources of law.
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 10-a(2).
99 Id.
100 See N.Y. STAT. LAW § 124 (McKinney 2014) (“In ascertaining the purpose and
applicability of a statute, it is proper to consider the legislative history of the act, the
circumstances surrounding the statute’s passage, and the history of the times.”); see also, e.g.,
Riley v. Cnty. of Broome, 742 N.E.2d 98, 102 (N.Y. 2000) (“[T]he legislative history of an
enactment may also be relevant and is not to be ignored, even if words [of the statute] be
clear . . . . Pertinent also are the history of the times, the circumstances surrounding the statute’s
passage, and . . . attempted amendments.); Astoria Gas Turbine Power, LLC v. Tax Comm’n of
City of N.Y., 788 N.Y.S.2d 417 (App. Div. 2005), leave to appeal dismissed, 835 N.E.2d 662
(N.Y. 2005), leave to appeal granted, 844 N.E.2d 792 (N.Y. 2006), judgment aff’d, 2006 WL
2945433 (N.Y. 2006).
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Arguably the best source of legislative intent is in the Marriage
Equality Act session law;101 this text was actually voted by the
legislature into law, and thus is least vulnerable to criticism. In this case,
the session law included a statement of legislative intent which
indicated that the legislators intended for same-sex couples to have
equal access to all benefits and protections of marriage. 102 Furthermore,
it stated that the legislature intended to remove all distinctions related to
marriage based on gender, even if not explicitly enumerated in the
statute.103
Other elements of legislative intent are instructive as well, even if
not actually voted on by the legislature. For example, the sponsor’s
memorandum sets forth the specifics of a proposed bill, as well as a
statement explaining why this particular bill is deemed necessary. 104
The sponsor’s memorandum for the Marriage Equality Act provides,
inter alia, that civil marriage creates benefits in areas including “child
custody” specifically, and “marital privacy” more generally. 105
Similarly, the bill jacket106 states that the Act’s main goal is to reduce
discrimination against same-sex couples and their families.107
101
102

Marriage Equality Act, 2011 N.Y. Sess. Laws Ch. 95 § 2 (McKinney).
Id. (“Same-sex couples should have the same access as others to the protections,
responsibilities, rights, obligations, and benefits of civil marriage.”).
103 The Act stated:
The omission from this act of changes to other provisions of law shall not be construed
as a legislative intent to preserve any legal distinction between same-sex couples and
different-sex couples with respect to marriage. The legislature intends that all
provisions of law which utilize gender-specific terms in reference to the parties to a
marriage, or which in any other way may be inconsistent with this act, be construed in
a gender-neutral manner or in any way necessary to effectuate the intent of this act.
Id.
104 See generally R5 (Jan. 7, 2015), https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/resolutions/2015/r5
(adopting the Rules of the Senate for the 2015–16 Sesion) (“Every bill introduced . . . shall be
accompanied by the introducer’s memorandum . . . . Such memorandum shall contain a statement
of the purposes and intent of the bill and, if the member deems it appropriate, may set forth such
other statements that the member feels necessary . . . .”); Rules of the Assembly of the State of
New York 2015–2016 § 1(f) (Jan. 7, 2015) http://assembly.state.ny.us/Rules/2015rules.pdf
(“There shall be appended to every bill introduced in the Assembly, an introducer’s
memorandum. . . .”); see also Eric Lane, Legislative Process and Its Judicial Renderings: A Study
in Contrast, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 639, 646 (1987) (“New York legislative rules require that a
sponsor’s bill memorandum accompany the introduction of all bills. The memorandum must
contain a statement of the purposes and intent of the bill.”).
105 N.Y. STATE ASSEMB., MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF A.B. 8354, 234th Leg., Reg. Sess.
(2012).
106 While citations to bill jackets were rare before the 1990s, the New York Court of Appeals
began a marked increase in bill jacket citations in the 1990s. See William H. Manz, The Citation
Practices of the New York Court of Appeals: A Millennium Update, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 1273,
1287–89 (2001). Since then citations to bill jackets have even gained somewhat favored status.
E.g., Konviser v. State, 687 N.Y.S.2d 877, 880 (Ct. Cl. 1999) (“[T]he court should look to the
legislative history . . . especially the Bill Jacket . . . .” (citation omitted)).
107 Letter from Daniel O’Donnell, Member of Assembly, N.Y. State Assembly to The Hon.
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While these various indicators of legislative intent were not
codified into law, they should still be utilized by courts interpreting the
Marriage Equality Act. This is especially relevant in relation to the
Domestic Relations Law section 10-a(2), which was deliberately
phrased broadly in the hope that courts and other interpreters would
make use of it to fill in any loopholes not addressed by statute.108
II. ANALYSIS OF THE NEED FOR SAME-SEX PARENTAL PROTECTIONS
The above-mentioned methods for establishing legal parental rights
are especially important for same-sex couples, as existing rules and
conventions are less likely to apply precisely to their situations. This
section of this Note provides several examples in which the existing
system was unable to properly address the needs of same-sex parents.
Those couples looking for additional legal protections in same-sex
adoption recently suffered a setback in a January 2014 Surrogate’s
Court ruling, In re Seb C-M.109 In the case, one member of a married
same-sex couple had given birth to a child who was being raised by
both members of the couple.110 In the petition, the mother who was not
biologically related to the child sought to legally adopt him.111 The court
ultimately held that the non-biological mother was not entitled to adopt
that couple’s child.112 The court reasoned that the couple already had
full legal rights, and that prior courts had held that adoption was not
intended to reaffirm legal relationships that already existed, but only to
create new ones.113 Furthermore, the judge stated that if the parents
Mylan Denerstein, Counsel to the Governor, June 14, 2011, N.Y. BILL JACKET, 2011 A.B. 8354,
234th Leg., Reg. Sess. (2011).
108 The Legislature's methodology in drafting the statute has been described as follows:
Rather than amending each and every marriage, divorce, annulment, ancillary relief, or
other section in the Domestic Relations Law, the Legislature has broadly decreed that,
when necessary to implement the rights and responsibilities of spouses under the law,
“all gender-specific language or terms shall be construed in a gender-neutral manner in
all such sources of law”. [sic] The phrase “all such sources of law” may be read as
implying that the Family Court Act, the General Obligations Law and all other statutes
impacting marital rights and responsibilities shall be so construed, as should case law
precedents.
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 10-a(2), construed in Alan D. Scheinkman, Practice Commentaries, N.Y.
DOM. REL. LAW § 10-a (McKinney 2011).
109 In re Seb C-M, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 31, 2014 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. Jan. 6, 2014). It should be noted that
this case was heard in Surrogate’s Court—a low-level trial court—and thus may be of limited
precedential value, though it is a noteworthy decision in regards to the subject matter it addresses.
See N.Y. Const. art. VI, § 12 (providing for the creation of Surrogate’s Court and its jurisdiction).
110 Seb C-M, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 31, 2014, at 1–2.
111 Id.
112 Id. at 4.
113 Id. at 1 (“Adoption is not utilized for, nor . . . is it available to reaffirm, an already existing
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intended to obtain additional protections for their legal relationship to
their child in case the family traveled to a jurisdiction less friendly to
same-sex couples, then the parents should have litigated in the courts of
that hostile jurisdiction.114 Though second-parent adoptions, like the one
attempted in Seb C-M, were previously a preferred method of
establishing parental rights, this decision makes clear the necessity of
discerning a new method applicable to same-sex couples post-marriage
equality. The decision in Seb C-M left the non-biological mother
unclear on her legal rights to her child in other jurisdictions,115 a
situation which is untenable, even after the decision in Obergefell.
However, this hypothetical new method should also be applicable
to couples without that presumption of legitimacy—in other words,
couples who were not married prior to having a child together. These
couples are at an even greater risk than those with such a presumption,
as their rights can be questioned even within New York.116 As a recent
example, in In re Jann P. v. Jamie P., the Family Court held that a
woman who parented a child for virtually his entire life had no legal
right to the child because she was not married to the child’s biological
mother.117 The court acknowledged that the petitioner in that case was
situated differently as a woman, because there is no existing statutory
equivalent of paternity proceedings for women.118 However, despite
citing New York’s Marriage Equality Act, the court chose to leave the
matter to the legislature for further remedy. 119 This Note posits that
while the court in Jann P. recognized the issues, it could—and should—
have gone further and applied the Marriage Equality Act to the existing
parent/child relationship.” (citing In re Sebastian, 25 Misc.3d 567, 572 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. Co.
2009))). The court also noted that in New York, a birth certificate is prima facie evidence of
parentage. Id. at 2 (citing N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4103 (McKinney 2014)).
114 Id.
115 Id. at 3–4. Though at the time the focus of other jurisdictions was states which did not
recognize same-sex marriage, the underlying concern is still applicable to states which may have
differing laws on adoption or parentage, or other countries which do not recognize same-sex
relationships at all. For example, the Supreme Court recently held that an adoption order from
one state must be given full faith and credit by another state. V.L. v. E.L., 136 S. Ct. 1017 (2016).
However, the opinion does not require a state to give any particular rights to same-sex couples,
but only to honor certain rights granted by other states. Id.
116 As discussed previously, the New York Court of Appeals has held that, at least in some
cases, a biological stranger’s lack of relationship to a child can trump equitable estoppel, resulting
in a parent losing his or her legal rights to the child. See Debra H. v. Janice R., 930 N.E.2d 184
(N.Y. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 908 (2011); see also supra Part I.C.
117 In re Jann P. v. Jamie P., N.Y. L.J., July 25, 2014, at 6–7 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. June 30, 2014);
see also John Leland, Parenthood Denied by the Law: After a Same-Sex Couple’s Breakup, a
Custody Battle, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/14/nyregion/
after-a-same-sex-couples-breakup-a-custody-battle.html.
118 Jann P., N.Y. L.J., July 25, 2014 at 6.
119 Id. at 6–7 (“[T]he passage of the Marriage Equality Act is a significant step toward the
view that removing gender distinctions from the framework of our matrimonial laws will
strengthen New York’s families.”).
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paternity statutes, rather than waiting for the legislature to craft a new
solution.
In Seb C-M, the judge stated that after New York’s legalization of
same-sex marriage, it was necessary to apply the presumption of
legitimacy to all children of legal marriages, regardless of the method of
conception and birth.120 Much of the basis of the judge’s decision was
an attempt—presumably in good faith—to grant all due deference to the
newly held rights of same-sex couples and same-sex parents in New
York.121 Additionally, the decision was based on the worry that doing
otherwise would potentially raise Equal Protection122 violations.123
These concerns stemmed from the judge’s belief that allowing the
petitioner to adopt her child—to whom the judge said she should have
legal rights based on the marital presumption of legitimacy—would
imply that petitioner’s marriage is not fully equal to that of a differentsex couple.124 However, the court’s concerns are based on the
presumption of legitimacy, not the additional affirmation through
adoption.125 This is a fallacy in logic—the court is assuming that
affirming petitioner’s legal rights would imply that it is necessary to do
so for all married same-sex parents. However, this is not true; instead,
the court would merely be affirming an already-existing right; it would
neither be creating a new privilege nor requiring same-sex couples to
engage in additional steps to receive the right.126
Here, the court’s view of the Equal Protection argument creates an
unnecessary complication: under the court’s existing logic, by granting
the petitioner’s request to adopt the child the court would be denigrating
the legal status of same-sex relations in New York.127 However, denying
120 Seb C-M, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 31, 2014, at 2 (“[R]ecognition of marriage equality rights, coupled
with advances in assisted reproductive technologies, necessarily results in application of the
presumption of legitimacy to offspring of parents in lawful same-sex and opposite-sex marriages,
regardless of the circumstances of conception, gestation and birth of such children.”).
121 Id. at 3.
122 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
123 Seb C-M, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 31, 2014, at 3.
124 Id. (“[W]ere this court to entertain the instant petition, such action would imply that,
notwithstanding the existing and lawful marital relationship between the petitioner and her
spouse, true marriage equality remains yet to be attained, and that, although legally recognized in
this state, a same-sex marriage remains somehow insufficient to establish a parent-child
relationship between one particular parent and any child born within that marriage, thereby
raising equal protection concerns.”).
125 Id. at 2–3.
126 This logic is based on the underlying notion of the common law system. Under the
common law, courts do not create new rights from thin air, but rather reinterpret existing law to
clarify rights that were not previously recognized. See, e.g., Common Law, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
127 Seb C-M, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 31, 2014, at 3 (“Indeed, were this court to entertain the instant
petition, such action would imply that, notwithstanding the existing and lawful marital
relationship between the petitioner and her spouse, true marriage equality remains yet to be
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the petition forces her to seek out a hostile jurisdiction if she still desires
to affirm her legal parental rights.128 Instead, the court would be better
served by granting petitioner’s request, and explaining that it is doing so
in order to avoid equal protection concerns—specifically those concerns
raised by subjecting petitioner and her child to a jurisdiction which does
not recognize same-sex rights from other states, let alone allow those
rights to be created within its own state.
The judge in Seb C-M posited that states could not deny marriages
performed in other states under the Due Process Clause, thus obviating
the need for additional legal procedures—beyond marriage and the
resulting presumption of legitimacy—within New York.129 However,
this is not quite true, or at least does not apply to all states.130
While there are many other arguments in favor of having all courts
recognize valid adoptions regardless of a parent’s gender, in many cases
that is all they currently are—arguments.131 In reality, not all states have
recognized such adoptions.132 Thus, the question remains, what can
parents in the shoes of the plaintiffs in Seb C-M do to avoid such an
unfavorable ruling?
III. PROPOSAL TO UTILIZE NEW YORK’S MARRIAGE EQUALITY ACT TO
attained, and that, although legally recognized in this state, a same-sex marriage remains
somehow insufficient to establish a parent-child relationship between one particular parent and
any child born within that marriage, thereby raising equal protection concerns.”).
128 Id. (“If in fact the petitioner’s and M.M.’s intent is to secure additional protection of their
family’s legal relationship in order to assure its recognition in the event of relocation to a
jurisdiction hostile to marriage equality, the more appropriate, and indeed necessary, course of
action would be to seek redress of the denial of their civil rights in such jurisdiction.”).
129 Id. at 3–4. The opinion also uses the Equal Protection Clause as grounds for petitioners to
seek redress in other jurisdictions’ courts. Id.
130 Seb C-M cites some of the successful same-sex marriage cases which had been litigated up
to that time. Id. Though same-sex marriage has since been legalized, it is far from clear that the
presumption of legitimacy will be applied to same-sex couples in states like New York, let alone
states less friendly to same-sex interests. See Taylor & Palazzolo, supra note 74.
131 E.g., Christine L. Olson, Second-Class Families: Interstate Recognition of Queer Adoption,
43 FAM. L.Q. 161, 162 (2009) (“This article will argue that every state must recognize queer
adoptions from other states. To refuse to do so violates the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the
U.S. Constitution, the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the
fundamental right to travel.”); Robert G. Spector, The Unconstitutionality of Oklahoma’s Statute
Denying Recognition to Adoptions by Same-Sex Couples from Other States, 40 TULSA L. REV.
467 (2005).
132 Mishra, supra note 44, at 91–92 (“Although adoption in the United States has always been
left to the statutory control of each state, the states have reached a level of agreement over most
aspects of adoption policy that is remarkable—so much so, in fact, that cases in which states
refuse to recognize each other’s adoption decrees merit barely a footnote in conflict of laws
texts . . . . Yet over the last decade, states have diverged sharply with respect to one category of
adoption cases—namely, adoption by gays and lesbians.”). However, the recent Supreme Court
ruling will likely at least partially address this issue. See V.L. v. E.L., 136 S. Ct. 1017 (2016).
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BETTER PROTECT SAME-SEX PARENTS
This section proposes that courts utilize the portion of the Marriage
Equality Act calling for gender neutrality to reinterpret existing statutes
and procedures to be more inclusive of same-sex couples and their
families. As several examples of such interpretation, courts could
change the acknowledgment of paternity to a gender-neutral
acknowledgment of parentage, allow same-sex couples to utilize the
martial presumption of legitimacy, and similarly allow same-sex
couples to gain legal parental rights through equitable estoppel. This
section will also examine—and ultimately reject—several other
potential solutions to the problems faced by New York’s same-sex
parents.
A.

Proposal

One of the biggest problems with New York case law addressing
same-sex parental rights after the passage of the Marriage Equality Act
is that, while they recognize a shortcoming in the current state of the
law, the courts recommend that the petitioners find a better avenue for
addressing the issue, rather than the court doing so itself. 133 This Note
proposes that New York courts, such as the ones which decided Seb CM and Jann P., should instead interpret the Marriage Equality Act to
allow same-sex couples to affirm their parental rights and to gain equal
footing with different-sex parents.
As discussed above, the statutory language created by the Marriage
Equality Act provides that same-sex couples should obtain all benefits
from marriage that different-sex couples are entitled to.134 Furthermore,
the legislative history shows that the intent behind the law was to
provide full equality and rights to same-sex couples in relation to
marriage and its resulting privileges.135 Arguably, one of the privileges
resulting from marriage is the right to raise children together 136—for
133 For example, in Seb C-M, the judge stated that the petitioner would have to seek redress in
a jurisdiction which denied her parental rights, rather than being able to preemptively establish
them as the petitioner sought to. Seb C-M, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 31, 2014, at 3. In Jann P., the judge
notes “[t]he inequity of the imbalance of remedies available to the petitioner” but leaves any
solution to the legislature, and ultimately dismisses the petition. In re Jann P. v. Jamie P., N.Y.
L.J, July 25, 2014, at 6–7 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. June 30, 2014).
134 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 10-a(2) (McKinney 2014).
135 See supra Part I.F.
136 This principle was cited by the Supreme Court in its decision legalizing same-sex marriage.
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2600 (2015) (“A third basis for protecting the right to
marry is that it safeguards children and families and thus draws meaning from related rights of
childrearing, procreation, and education. . . . Marriage also affords the permanency and stability
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example, as previously discussed, the presumption of legitimacy is
based on a valid marriage.137 Thus, in order to fully effectuate the
legislature’s intent in passing the Marriage Equality Act, courts should
treat same-sex couples as equal to different-sex couples, even if the
specifics of statutory law have not yet caught up.
In this context, a court would look to the specifics of the genderneutrality provision of the Marriage Equality Act138 in order to
determine how to treat same-sex and different-sex couples equally. As
discussed earlier, this statutory language calls for treating genderspecific language in a “gender-neutral manner” “[w]hen necessary to
implement the rights and responsibilities of spouses under the law.”139
Though there is limited case law interpreting this portion of the statute,
it is clear that the law requires substituting “spouse” for “husband” or
“wife.”140 The Act’s legislative history, discussed above, indicates that
the legislature intended the Act to encompass more than the simple
action of marriage; among other factors, the legislature intended to grant
equal rights for the families of same-sex couples.141 Thus, in addition to
superficial changes like replacing gendered pronouns—he, she, etc.—
the Marriage Equality Act also requires the creation of new genderneutral procedures that provide same-sex couples with all the options
available to different-sex couples in the realm of marriage and its
associated rights and responsibilities—including parenting. Several
examples of this are set forth below.
1.

Acknowledgment of Parentage

One implementation of creating gender-neutral procedures would
be that any parent, regardless of gender, would be able to seek what is
now known as an acknowledgment of paternity.142 Though Family
important to children's best interests.”).
137 See supra Part I.D.
138 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 10-a(2).
139 Id.; see also supra Part I.F.
140 See Wendy G-M. v. Erin G-M., 985 N.Y.S.2d 845, 855 (Sup. Ct. 2014) (“The implication
of the MEA is unmistakable: wherever the words ‘husband’ or ‘wife’ exist in statute or common
law, the MEA requires the courts to read the terms as gender non-specific and extend the same
rights to same-sex couples as exist for opposite-sex couples. The MEA eradicates any distinction
between the sexes, but it does not address the definition of parenthood—it does not include a
definition of ‘parent.’”).
141 See supra Part I.F (discussing the sponsor’s memorandum and bill jacket, including
references within those documents to the inclusion of children and family within the
understanding of family and the intent of the Act).
142 A similar proposal would be to create equivalent rights through private contract among all
individuals who could claim parental rights. However, the current statutory scheme provides for
procedures and protections surrounding the acknowledgment of paternity that would be absent
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Court Act section 516-a—which governs acknowledgments of
paternity—specifically refers to “paternity,” courts should interpret the
word to mean “parentage,” or alternatively, “paternity or maternity.”
This is pursuant to the portion of the Marriage Equality Act which
requires gender neutrality in relation to marriage, “[w]hen necessary to
implement the rights and responsibilities of spouses.”143 Arguably, one
of the “rights and responsibilities” referred to is that of claiming a child
as one’s own in a paternity proceeding—or a parentage (to use the
gender-neutral term) or maternity proceeding.
The Marriage Equality Act only amended a handful of statutes,144
but it specified that the Act was meant to provide full equality to samesex couples—in the realm of marriage145—even in statutes not explicitly
mentioned.146 This, along with the gender-neutral provision of the
statute, provides courts with the ability and authorization to create a
common law order of parentage.
Thus, in Jann P.,147 the judge should not have appealed to a
legislative solution, but rather should have allowed a petition seeking an
order of maternity—as the judge clearly wanted to do.148 In
implementing a maternity proceeding, the judge could—and should—
have read the statute governing acknowledgments of paternity in a
gender-neutral manner, as required by the Marriage Equality Act.149
from any private contractual arrangement. Furthermore, a private contract would require
additional effort and expense on the part of same-sex couples, whereas in some cases the statute
instructs the state to provide assistance to different-sex couples without prompting. E.g., N.Y.
PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4135-b(1)(a)–(b) (McKinney 2014) (“Immediately preceding or following
the in-hospital birth of a child to an unmarried woman, the person in charge of such
hospital . . . shall provide to the child’s mother and putative father . . . the documents and written
instructions necessary for such mother and putative father to complete an acknowledgment of
paternity . . . [and] the mother and the putative father shall be provided . . . with such information
as is required pursuant to this section with respect to their rights and the consequences of signing
a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity . . . .”).
143 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 10-a(2).
144 Marriage Equality Act, 2011 N.Y. Sess. Laws Ch. 95 (McKinney).
145 As discussed above, based on the legislative history of the Marriage Equality Act courts
should interpret the realm of marriage loosely, and therefore include parenting. See supra Part I.F.
146 Marriage Equality Act, § 2 (“The omission from this act of changes to other provisions of
law shall not be construed as a legislative intent to preserve any legal distinction between samesex couples and different-sex couples with respect to marriage.”).
147 To briefly restate the facts of the case, the court held that a woman was unable to gain legal
rights to the child whom she had raised because New York does not have a female equivalent of
its paternity proceedings. Jann P. v. Jamie P., N.Y. L.J., July 25, 2014, at 6–7 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. June
30, 2014).
148 Id. at 6 (“While this predicament might have once been viewed as a normal and acceptable
consequence of society’s traditional view of what constitutes a family, the passage of the
Marriage Equality Act is a significant step toward the view that removing gender distinctions
from the framework of our matrimonial laws will strengthen New York’s families. . . . The
inequity of the imbalance of remedies available to the petitioner is highlighted in this case . . . .”
(citation omitted)).
149 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 10-a(2) (McKinney 2014) (“When necessary to implement the
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One limitation of this solution is that an acknowledgement of
parentage—like the existing acknowledgment of paternity—would
require the consent of both individuals acting as parents. 150 Thus, an
acknowledgment of parentage would likely not be utilized if the
individuals seeking parental rights are divided in their wishes for who
should parent the child.
2.

The Marital Presumption of Legitimacy

Though the creation of an order of maternity or parentage is one
way in which courts could effectuate the legislative intent behind the
Marriage Equality Act, it is far from the only one. An example presents
itself in remedying the paradox created by Seb C-M, the case in which
the judge refused to allow one parent to adopt her child on the grounds
that the parent already had full parental rights, despite the fact that other
courts might not recognize those rights.151 The judge attempted to pass
the problem off to courts in other jurisdictions.152 Instead, the judge
should have read the Marriage Equality Act and the clear legislative
intent153 to provide equal treatment to the same-sex couple before the
court. Different-sex couples do not have to seek additional rights in
order to have their marriages recognized in other states,154 and so to be
fully equal, same-sex couples should not be subjected to further
requirements either. Thus, the Surrogate’s Court should have allowed
the petitioner to adopt her child. One other reason the court dismissed
the petition was because of New York common law’s interpretation of
adoption—namely that a parent cannot adopt a child to whom he or she
already has legal rights.155 However, this precedent should be viewed as
abrogated by statute in light of the legislative intent behind the Marriage
Equality Act.156
rights and responsibilities of spouses under the law, all gender-specific language or terms shall be
construed in a gender-neutral manner in all such sources of law.”).
150 See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4135-b (McKinney 2014) (providing that the
acknowledgment includes voluntary statements from both the mother and the father); see also
N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 516-a (McKinney 2014); N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 111-k (McKinney 2014).
151 In re Seb C-M, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 31, 2014 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. Jan. 6, 2014).
152 Id. at 3.
153 See supra Part I.F.
154 E.g., Carr v. Carr, 104 N.Y.S.2d 269, 271 (Sup. Ct. 1951) (“The general rule in this and
other States is, that the laws of the State where the marriage is contracted, if not contrary to the
prohibitions of the natural law or the express provisions of a statute, determines its validity, even
as between residents of this State who leave their domicile to be married in another State.” (citing
Cunningham v. Cunningham, 99 N.E. 845 (N.Y. 1912))).
155 Seb C-M, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 31, 2014 at 1 (citing In re Sebastian, 879 N.Y.S.2d 677 (Sur. Ct.
2009)).
156 See supra Part I.F (stating that the legislative intent behind the Marriage Equality Act was
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Another illustration presents itself in a similar New York Family
Court case, Q.M. v. B.C.157 In that case a biological father brought a
paternity petition against the biological mother and the biological
mother’s wife.158 The defendant and her wife argued, inter alia, that
because the child was born during their legal marriage, the presumption
of legitimacy should protect the non-biological mother’s legal
relationship with the child.159 The Family Court judge discussed the
increasing irrelevance of the presumption of legitimacy in the face of
new technologies, such as DNA testing, and new familial arrangements,
such as same-sex couples.160 Ultimately, the judge held that the nonbiological mother was no different than any other stepparent, and did
not fit the state’s legal definition of “parent.”161
The judge also noted that the non-biological mother had never
adopted the child—implying that if she had done so there would then be
a legal parental relationship.162 Ironically, that adoption is analogous to
the adoption that was denied by the Surrogate’s Court in Seb C-M,163
creating further confusion for couples seeking to protect their parental
rights. Additionally, the judge in Q.M. specifically referenced the
gender-neutral provision of the Marriage Equality Act,164 but found that
the statute “does not preclude differentiation based on essential
biology.”165 The result of this case was that the non-biological mother,
who acted as the child’s second parent,166 was found to have no rights to

to, inter alia, create marital benefits including “marital privacy” and a reduction in discrimination
against same-sex couples).
157 Q.M. v. B.C., 995 N.Y.S.2d 470 (Fam. Ct. 2014).
158 Id. at 471–72.
159 Id. at 472. In fact the lesbian couple was in the process of a divorce during these
proceedings, but nevertheless, both women agreed that the father should be excluded from the
child’s life. Id. at 471–72. There was no dispute that the petitioner was the child’s biological
father. Id. at 472.
160 Id. at 473–74; see also supra note 74.
161 Q.M., 995 N.Y.S.2d at 474–75.
162 Id. at 474 (“[T]he Court of Appeals has repeatedly declined to expand the traditional
definition of a parent beyond biological or birth parents and adoptive parents. . . . As a result, [the
non-biological mother] stands in the position of many loving step-parents, male and female, who
are not legal parents and are not entitled to court ordered custody or visitation with their stepchildren. The fact that she was married to [the biological mother] at the time of [the child’s] birth,
under the facts here, does not change her status.”).
163 In re Seb C-M, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 31, 2014 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. Jan. 6, 2014).
164 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 10-a(2) (McKinney 2014) (“When necessary to implement the
rights and responsibilities of spouses under the law, all gender-specific language or terms shall be
construed in a gender-neutral manner in all such sources of law.”).
165 Q.M., 995 N.Y.S.2d at 474.
166 Id. at 473 (“In support of her position, Ms. C. notes that Ms. S. was at the hospital when
J.C. was born, selected the child’s name and signed her birth certificate. Both Ms. C. and Ms. S.
testified that Ms. S. has a close relationship with J.C. and that since their separation, Ms. C. has
permitted Ms. S. to have contact with the child.”).
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the child, whereas the father, who had only seen the child twice,167 was
able to seek custody or visitation of the child.168
Applying this Note’s proposal to Q.M. would result in allowing the
non-biological mother to utilize the presumption of legitimacy to gain a
legal relationship with the child. In the actual case, the judge held the
exact opposite.169 This ruling was based on what the judge saw as the
irrelevancy of the presumption of legitimacy itself, primarily due to the
ease with which modern technology can determine biological
parentage.170 However, the ruling does not eliminate the use of the
presumption of legitimacy completely, but rather only finds that it is
inapplicable to same-sex couples.171 This is clearly contrary to both the
Marriage Equality Act’s plain meaning172 and the legislative intent
behind it.173 Thus, interpreting the Act requires the court to allow samesex couples to utilize the marital presumption of legitimacy, just as it is
used by different-sex couples.
3.

Equitable Estoppel

Just as the marital presumption of legitimacy should be examined
subsequent to the legalization of same-sex marriage in New York, the
doctrine of equitable estoppel should be reanalyzed as well. Under the
Marriage Equality Act courts should allow both members of same-sex
couples to gain legal parental rights to their child, despite at least one
member of the couple being unrelated to the child.
As discussed above, the New York Court of Appeals’ decision in
Debra H. presents a significant barrier to same-sex couples seeking to
establish parental rights through the doctrine of equitable estoppel.174
167
168

Id. at 472.
See New York Court Refuses to Apply Parental Presumption for Married Same-Sex Couple,
LESBIAN/GAY L. NOTES, Dec. 2014, at 502–03 (“[The father] will have the status of a legal
parent who can seek court-ordered custody and visitation, as against [the non-biological mother],
who will have no such rights. If [the biological mother] were to die or become incapacitated from
taking care of [the child], [the father] would hold all the cards in a dispute with [the nonbiological mother] over custody and visitation.”).
169 Q.M., 995 N.Y.S.2d at 474.
170 Id. at 473.
171 Id. at 474. (“[The biological mother] argues that the rights of ‘non-biological parents’ are
entitled to the same constitutional protections afforded biological parents and suggests that the
Marriage Equality Act requires that all spouses be treated in a completely gender neutral manner.
It is this court’s view that the Marriage Equality Act does not require the court to ignore the
obvious biological differences between husbands and wives.”).
172 See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 10-a(2) (McKinney 2014) (“When necessary to implement the
rights and responsibilities of spouses under the law, all gender-specific language or terms shall be
construed in a gender-neutral manner in all such sources of law.”).
173 See supra Part I.F.
174 Debra H. v. Janice R., 930 N.E.2d 184 (N.Y. 2010); see also supra Part I.C.
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However, the case was decided prior to the passage of the Marriage
Equality Act,175 and so should be reinterpreted in light of the Act’s
requirement that no government treatment, with respect to marriage,
should be based on gender.176
Though the holding in Debra H.177 is hostile to same-sex couples,
one could argue that the holding, insofar as it pertains to non-biological
parents and their right to invoke equitable estoppel, is dictum. The
Court of Appeals emphatically stated its opposition to automatically
granting parental rights to biological strangers, but its final holding was
to grant the non-biological mother standing to seek visitation rights
and/or custody of the child, based on the child’s best interests. 178 This,
in turn, was based on the fact that the couple had entered into a civil
union in Vermont—where it was legal—and therefore, both partners
would be considered a “parent” of any child resulting from that
union.179 Therefore, the court’s holding on non-biological parents was
largely irrelevant to the ultimate outcome of the case, as its final
decision was predicated on the existence of a legal union, not on
biology.180
While arguments exist to distinguish Debra H., as it stands, the
case presents a substantial hurdle to non-biological parents—“biological
strangers,” in the language of the court.181 While Debra H. arose from a
contested issue between two parents, it could also possibly stymie
amicable efforts of same-sex parents to co-parent a child, as at least one
parent remains a biological stranger and therefore potentially subject to
the court’s ruling.182 Thus, if the portion of the case pertaining to
175 The ruling in Debra H. was issued in May 2010, and the Marriage Equality Act was passed
in June 2011. Debra H., 930 N.E.2d 184; see also Marriage Equality Act, 2011 N.Y. Sess. Laws
Ch. 95 (McKinney).
176 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 10-a(2) (“No government treatment or legal status, effect, right,
benefit, privilege, protection or responsibility relating to marriage, whether deriving from statute,
administrative or court rule, public policy, common law or any other source of law, shall differ
based on the parties to the marriage being or having been of the same sex rather than a different
sex.” (emphasis added)). Some courts have used this logic in the wake of Obergefell. For
example, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma expanded that state’s “equitable doctrine of in loco
parentis”—similar to New York’s equitable estoppel—to apply to same-sex couples, drawing on
the principles discussed by the Court in Obergefell. Ramey v. Sutton, 362 P.3d 217 (Okla. 2015).
177 Debra H., 930 N.E.2d 184.
178 Id. at 197. Though the best interest standard could in some cases protect the rights of samesex parents, it is too amorphous a standard to be the only legal protection. That standard, if
utilized alone, creates the potential for judges to make determinations based solely on a
petitioner’s sexual orientation. Alternatively, under this Note’s proposal, a doctrine like equitable
estoppel would apply gender-neutral factors to determine parental rights, which would then be
subject to a court’s determination of a child’s best interests.
179 Id. at 196–97.
180 Id. at 194–95.
181 Id. at 189.
182 Id.
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biological strangers is not considered dictum, it could additionally be
considered abrogated by the Marriage Equality Act.
Much of the basis for the court’s decision in Debra H. was the fact
that the statute referred to “parents,” and the court felt only the
legislature should redefine the term.183 The legislature’s redefinition that
the Debra H. court was looking for can be found in the Marriage
Equality Act. While the Act does not explicitly include a definition, 184 it
does make it clear that it intends to expand the privileges of marriage,
including child rearing, to same-sex couples.185 Therefore it is implicit
in the statute that both members of a same-sex couple—including one
which is necessarily a biological stranger—be considered parents.
Some New York courts have already allowed same-sex couples to
utilize equitable estoppel in asserting parentage,186 but this is far from a
uniform implementation.187
B.

Rejected Alternative Solutions

In light of decisions such as the one in Seb C-M,188 same-sex
couples are left wondering how best to protect their legal parental rights
while the courts attempt to pass the issue off to other bodies—be it the
legislature or the courts of other states.189 Though the preceding
183 Id. at 193 (“[A]ny change in the meaning of ‘parent’ under our law should come by way of
legislative enactment rather than judicial revamping of precedent.”).
184 Marriage Equality Act, 2011 N.Y. Sess. Laws Ch. 95 (McKinney); see also Wendy G-M.
v. Erin G-M, 985 N.Y.S.2d 845, 855 (Sup. Ct. 2014) (“The MEA eradicates any distinction
between the sexes, but it does not address the definition of parenthood—it does not include a
definition of ‘parent.’”).
185 See supra Part I.F.
186 See Arriaga v. Dukoff, 999 N.Y.S.2d 504 (App. Div. 2014), lv. granted sub nom. Estrellita
A. v. Jennifer L.D., 38 N.E.3d 827 (N.Y. 2015). This case is the appeal of a Family Court
decision in which a biological mother sought support from her former domestic partner, who had
previously helped raise the child. Id. The non-biological mother was found to be a parent under
the doctrine of equitable estoppel. Id.; see also New York Appellate Division Finds Lesbian Birth
Mother “Judicially Estopped” From Denying Former Partner’s Parental Status, LESBIAN/GAY
L. NOTES, Jan. 2015, at 13.
187 See, e.g., Q.M. v. B.C., 995 N.Y.S.2d 470 (Fam. Ct. 2014). Q.M. was decided in 2014,
after the passage of the Marriage Equality Act. Id.; see also Marriage Equality Act, 2011 N.Y.
Sess. Laws Ch. 95. In Q.M., the judge ruled that equitable estoppel did not bar a biological father
from commencing a paternity petition against the biological mother and her wife. Q.M., 995
N.Y.S.2d at 476. The judge’s logic is somewhat specific to the facts of the case—it is based in
part on the age of the child at the commencement of the petition, and the fact that the father never
agreed to allow the respondent couple to raise the child—and so it is unclear whether the decision
would be different if the respondents were a different-sex couple. Id. at 474–76.
188 To reiterate the facts of the case, the judge denied the non-biological mother’s request to
adopt the child, and recommended that the petitioner seek redress in a different jurisdiction. In re
Seb C-M, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 31, 2014, at 1 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. Jan. 6, 2014).
189 See, e.g., David Dodge, At the Cutting Edge of Gay Family Law, N.Y. TIMES (June 17,
2014, 10:05 AM), http://parenting.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/06/17/at-the-cutting-edge-of-gay-
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proposals by this Note present several solutions, they are far from the
only possibilities, nor are they even the most optimal. This section will
explore other potential solutions, and then explain why they were
ultimately rejected.
Within New York State, an ideal solution would be for the
legislature to amend the existing Marriage Equality Act to clarify that it
is meant to encompass other more peripheral aspects of marriage,
including parenting, in addition to the more obvious features of
marriage. Such an ideal amendment would also provide specific
examples of gender neutrality, though still requiring interpretation in
other areas as the current law does.190 Even more ideal would be
national legislation requiring all states to recognize same-sex marriages
performed elsewhere, along with other legal rights accompanying those
marriages.191 However, these idealized proposals are unrealistic, and
this Note’s proposal is one which could be implemented without
legislative involvement.
One other simple option is for same-sex couples to seek out a more
favorable court in their attempts to formalize legal relationships with
their children.192 While this option is not available everywhere, in New
York, the Family Court and Surrogate’s Court have concurrent
jurisdiction over certain matters, including adoption and
guardianship.193 However, whereas Surrogate’s Court is focused on
family-law; James C. McKinley Jr., N.Y. Judge Alarms Gay Parents by Finding Marriage Law
Negates Need for Adoption, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/29/
nyregion/ny-judge-alarms-gay-parents-by-finding-marriage-law-negates-need-for-adoption.html.
190 It is possible to provide instructive examples without simultaneously excluding situations
which were not explicitly enumerated. See, e.g., Ejusdem Generis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
(10th ed. 2014) (“A canon of construction holding that when a general word or phrase follows a
list of specifics, the general word or phrase will be interpreted to include only items of the same
class as those listed.”).
191 This has been proposed previously. E.g., Lauren Lombardo, Note, Does Heather Have Two
Mommies?: The Importance of Full Faith and Credit Recognition Ftr [sic] Adoptions by SameSex Couples, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1301, 1338 (2012) (“[T]his Note urges Congress to pass a
‘Protection of Adopted Children Act,’ which would guarantee same-sex adoptive parents the
same rights as any other adoptive parents in the United States.”); Nancy D. Polikoff, A Mother
Should Not Have to Adopt Her Own Child: Parentage Laws for Children of Lesbian Couples in
the Twenty-First Century, 5 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 201, 265 (2009) (“Enactment of a genderneutral, marital status-neutral statute governing conception through donor insemination, along the
lines of the Model ABA Act, is a plausible strategy to protect lesbian couples and their
children.”).
192 Seb C-M was heard in New York Surrogate’s Court. Seb C-M, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 31, 2014.
193 See Fuss v. Niceforo, 665 N.Y.S.2d 781, 782 (App. Div. 1997) (stating that Surrogate’s
Court has concurrent jurisdiction with Family Court); Aleksander K. v. Elena K., 784 N.Y.S.2d
918 (Fam. Ct. 2004) (“Family Court and Surrogate’s Court are both superior trial courts of
limited jurisdiction. They have concurrent jurisdiction in certain areas, e.g., adoptions and
guardianships . . . .” (emphasis in original)); Robert M. Elardo, Equal Protection Denied in New
York to Some Family Law Litigants in Supreme Court: An Assigned Counsel Dilemma for the
Courts, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1125 (2002).
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property issues, Family Court—as the name suggests—deals with
family-related issues, and its overriding standard in cases involving
children, generally, is the best interest of the child.194 Thus, it is possible
that a Family Court judge who specializes in family issues, and whose
main focus is the best interests of a child, may be more receptive to a
same-sex couple’s arguments than a Surrogate’s Court judge who deals
with adoption and guardianship issues only as two of many unrelated
areas of jurisdiction.195 However, it is not a tenable solution to merely
avoid certain courts altogether.
The solution proposed by the judge in Seb C-M was essentially for
the petitioners to look to the courts of more hostile states, rather than
relying on a state such as New York, which had already granted them
full parental rights.196 This presents several problems, the most apparent
of which is standing. Generally, there is a “case and controversy”
requirement in the Constitution which prevents advisory opinions—at
its most basic this means that there has to be an actual harm which can
be redressed in order for a federal court to hear a case.197 Applying that
requirement to parents seeking to affirm their legal parental rights, it
would mean that first the parents must suffer an injury, such as a state
denying them legal rights to their child. The reason Seb C-M was
brought in the first place was to preemptively avoid such a denial.198
The parents could seek a declaratory judgment,199 but even that
proceeding requires that the issue not be completely hypothetical, which
would make it moot.200 In this case, that likely means that at the very
194 See, e.g., Eden M. v. Ines R., 410 N.Y.S.2d 997, 998–99 (Fam. Ct. 1978) (explaining the
jurisdiction held by Family Court and by Surrogate’s Court); Paul M. Coltoff, et al., Concurrent
jurisdiction of surrogate's court and family court, 1 CARMODY-WAIT 2d § 2:221 (2015).
195 See, e.g., TIMOTHY TIPPINS, 3 NEW YORK MATRIMONIAL LAW AND PRACTICE § 20:2
(2014) (discussing the history of the “best interest of the child” standard in New York,
particularly in the context of custody).
196 Seb C-M, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 31, 2014 at 3 (“If in fact the petitioner’s and M.M.’s intent is to
secure additional protection of their family’s legal relationship in order to assure its recognition in
the event of relocation to a jurisdiction hostile to marriage equality, the more appropriate, and
indeed necessary, course of action would be to seek redress of the denial of their civil rights in
such jurisdiction.”).
197 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)
(“Over the years, our cases have established that the irreducible constitutional minimum of
standing contains three elements. First, the plaintiff must have suffered an ‘injury in fact’ . . . .”).
198 Seb C-M, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 31, 2014 at 1 (“The petitioner appears to have filed the instant
application out of an abundance of caution, perhaps to ensure that, with the support of judicial
imprimatur, her existing parental relationship with the infant is less susceptible to challenge in the
event of the family’s re-location to a jurisdiction less hospitable to the rights of same-sex couples
to marry and adopt children.”).
199 A declaratory judgment is defined as “[a] binding adjudication that establishes the rights
and other legal relations of the parties without providing for or ordering enforcement.” Judgment,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
200 See, e.g., James Buchwalter, et al., 26 C.J.S. Declaratory Judgments §§ 31–32 (2015); see
also Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 402 (1975) (“[T]his Court, noting the difficulty in
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least, the parents would have to be likely to encounter a denial of their
rights, such as by living in a jurisdiction which does not allow adoption
by same-sex couples. Thus, it would be difficult for a parent to
preemptively establish his or her legal parental rights without first
entering a situation in which those rights are challenged.
One of the most discussed arguments surrounding same-sex
parenting is that the Full Faith and Credit Clause should require—with
no statutory changes—states to recognize out-of-state adoptions
regardless of the parents’ gender.201 This seems the likely implication of
the Supreme Court's recent decision in V.L. v. E.L., but this decision still
would not force states to grant parenting rights to same-sex couples, but
only to recognize those already granted by other states.202
CONCLUSION
The specific proposals advanced by this Note are not an exhaustive
list of reforms to the current statutory and common law scheme to
remedy this issue. Rather, they are meant to illustrate several ways in
which New York courts can examine problems currently faced by samesex couples and solve them through the Marriage Equality Act.203 There
will be problems faced by couples not predicted by this Note, and the
courts should utilize the same method—interpreting the legislative
intent behind the Marriage Equality Act—in order to solve them, where
possible. Thus, this Note and its proposals are meant as a starting point
for courts to begin to address the barriers faced by same-sex parents
fashioning a precise test of universal application for determining whether a request for declaratory
relief had become moot, held that, basically, the question in each case is whether the facts
alleged, under all the circumstances, show that there is a substantial controversy, between parties
having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a
declaratory judgment.”).
201 E.g., Joseph A. Fraioli, Note, Having Faith in Full Faith & Credit: Finstuen, Adar, and the
Quest for Interstate Same-Sex Parental Recognition, 98 IOWA L. REV. 365 (2012); Steve Sanders,
Interstate Recognition of Parent-Child Relationships: The Limits of the State Interests Paradigm
and the Role of Due Process, 2011 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 233 (2011); Olson, supra note 131;
Lombardo, supra note 191.
202 See V.L. v. E.L., 136 S. Ct. 1017 (2016). The ramifications of this decision remain to be
seen, but some states have remained unwilling to enforce decisions in favor of same-sex
marriage, a potential harbinger of states' reactions to this latest decision. For example, before
same-sex marriage was legalized nationwide there was conflict between a federal court’s holding
permitting same-sex marriage, and Alabama state judges unwilling to implement the ruling. See
Campbell Robertson & Shaila Dewan, In Defiance on Gay Marriage, Alabama Sets Itself Far
Apart, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 10, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/11/us/in-defiance-alabamasets-itself-far-apart.html. After the Supreme Court's decision in Obergefell there continued to be
conflict from less amenable states. See, e.g., Emma Green, Kim Davis Is Winning, THE ATLANTIC
(Sept. 9, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/09/the-triumph-of-kim-davis/
404410.
203 2011 N.Y. Sess. Laws Ch. 95 (McKinney).
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immediately, without the need to wait for lethargic legislative action or
for a Supreme Court ruling on the issue.

